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LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 
William O. Miller 
Today I am going to ~peak to you 
about a problem area which has been 
till! ~uhject of much discussion among 
publicists, that is, whether or not ex-
isting rules of naval warfare arc su[-
fieirnt to meet the needs of eurnmt 
naval opl·rations. Stated in another way, 
do existing rules of international la·w 
have real rr.levance to prescn t an II f ore-
sl'I'ablc USl:S of naval force in situations 
often characterized as short o[ war'? In 
d,·aling with this suhject it is not my 
intent to offer solutions, but I do hope 
to stimulate your thinking on this sub-
jl·l·t, 01\1' I ronsidl'r I:xtremdy important 
to the operation o[ l'onlemporary naval 
for(,l·s. 
MOf':t traditional inh:rnational law 
puhlieisls have approadlCd their subject 
hy fil:lling up two ollVio\H; categories 
within whi(·h to di~(:u!i.<; international 
It·gal rull:s-the laws of "war" and the 
laws of "pcaee." The legitimacy of the 
usc of naval power, as with othcr 
coercive mcasures, has been generally 
diseusscd in thc contcxt of thesc two 
extremcs. Using this rationale, the spe-
cific usc o[ [oree at sea in a given 
situation can be characterized as legal or 
illegal, depending upon the exif;tenec of 
a state' of war. Such thin king ha~ 1)(:en 
criticized by many as obviously unsatis-
faetory, sinec, on the contemporary 
sel:ne, states sometimes pl:reeive a need 
to exercise some limitcd degrec of force 
at sea which they find difficult to 
justify under a pl'acI:timc mgime, ImL 
yet find themselves unwilling to dedan: 
a fitate of war. However, to simply fiay 
that currl'nt situations involving po::;::;ible 
use of naval force lIlay not fit neatly 
into one or the other of these tradi-
tional eategories docs not adequately set 
forth the true nature of the problem. 
Nor does it neeessarily II:ad to the 
conclusion that new rules arc rc:quired. 
This, then, is the broad question 
which is Lo be examined here, i.e., 
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wlwther there is a need for a new st:l of 
rilles of naval warfare to apply in 
sitllations which arc neithcr "war" nor 
"peace" in the classic scnse. 
I mllst add an aside at this point, 
primarily because I know that when one 
is first exposcdto international law, and 
particularly to the "laws of war," qucs· 
tions arise along the following lincs: 
• Is not war simply a. malll'r of till: 
stronger or more operationally all"pt 
nation winning a victory through skillful 
application of force'? 
• If this is truc, are there really any 
"laws of war" or is it just an :\(:adelllie 
exercise of lawyers and politicians'? 
• On the other side of the coin, if 
rational men now agrcI! that war is a 
destructive force which must bl: ahan-
doned as an instrulllent of national 
poliey, why should rules for the I:on-
duct of war be formulated at all'? 
I will not attempt to dcal specifically 
with these ,!uestions bllt will briefly 
comment on the nccessity to formulate 
rules for the conduct of war. 
There arc two basic principles which 
guide ;IIlY inquiry into the rilles of 
warfare. These arc the principles of 
miliLary n,:cessity and the principle of 
humanitarianism. The sp,!<:ific rules of 
warfare both on land and on the sea, 
whieh haVI! LII:lm g':n,:rally agrcl:d IIpon 
for the (llIst J 00 years, have sough t Lo 
bring these two conel:l'ts into balancI!. 
The essential thrust of tlles(: rulc:s for 
warfare aL sea has been to reserve for 
Lhe beiligerenL, wiLhin the bOlll.HJs of 
humanitarianism, the right to attack 
thosc objects which were reeogni"a:d as 
legitimate military objectives. It also 
provided the belligerent with the right 
to use such force as may be necessary to 
attain his objective, while at the same 
time providin~ proteetion-as was physi-
cally possible under the eireulllstmH:es-
to noneombat:mts who JlJay lu!eonw 
involved and 10 survivors of thl' m:tion. 
Also, it is p;enerally agrel'd that the 
IlJaJor political purpOSI: of LI\(' tradi-
tional law of naval warfan: was to 
attelllpt to limit 1111: dfeds of eomhaL 
at sea as much as possible boLh as Lo the: 
area of the conflicL and as Lo Lhe 
parLieipanLs; LhaL is, Lo circumscribe the 
eon flicL so LhaL it did noL spill over Lo 
affect any more than necessary Lhe 
rights of sLatcs who wcre not parLies. fL 
was in this conLexL that the greaL body 
of law regarding bellig(:rent and neuLral 
rights al1(J duti(:s as WI: know il today 
urm;c::* 
NeutraliLy is a cone!!!,L in LrudiLional 
internaLional law which arises only 
when a state of war exisLs beLween Iwo 
or more other sLates. Traditional law 
gave belligerenL righLs and obligaLions to 
the parLies to a war. For those staLes not 
purLicil'aLing, the law provid(:d corre-
sponding neuLral obligations m\(.1 rights. 
The exiSLence of a legal sLaLe of war 
broughL Lhese rights and obligaLions inLO 
exisLell(:e. 
NI'II traliLy is defincd under Lrudi-
tional international law as the nonpar-
ticipuLion of a statc in a war bc:Lwel:n 
other states. The Icgal signifie:lI1cI: of 
such nonl'arLicipation is thaL iL brings 
inLo opera Lion numerous rules whose 
purpose is the regulation of relaLions 
between neutrals and bdliw~rents, pro-
viding certain righLs and obligaLions for 
boLh parLies:H The principlc of imJlur-
ti:llily holds LhaL a neutral Rlal(! is 
required to fulfill iL'l obligations uud 
enforee its rights in an equal mannc:r 
Loward all hdligc:rl'nLs. 
AILhough the rules of IwutraliLY W('n: 
violatud on a large scale during both 
'lONWII' 10-2, 'l'I1I! Law of N"pal lI'"r/t.re 
is a generally accurate summary or the tradi-
Lional rules or naval warrare. It is premised on 
Ihe "war" and "peacc" categorizations or 
classical writers, Basic to this traditional 
treatment arc the concepts or belligrrenL and 
ncutral righls which, in theory, lIeatly lak(:s 
into account both participants and nOllpartici-
pan Is in a ronflit:t. 
""lOThc bulk or Ihl:s(' nlles,as thl'y n'la'" to 
maritime: warrare: arc sl'l rorth in the \Iagur. 
COllvl'lIlion 011 til(' IUghts and Dntil:s or 
N('utrall'()wl:l"S in Mariti'lIl! War, 
World War J and World War II, the j 907 
Haglll: Conventions on the Rights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers in Land and 
Maritime Warfare, to which the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. arc partieg, still 
stateg the basic law of neu tral-belliger-
ent rc\utionship. Generully these rules 
provide for: 
• inviolability of neutral territory or 
territorial waters from hostilities; 
• no usc of neutral territory as a 
belligerent base of operations for filling 
out of ships or other combatant foree~ 
or as a warship sanctuary for longer 
than a stated period; 
• no usc of neutral territory for the 
transshipment of belligerent troops or 
war supplies; 
• a neutral is not bound, however, 
to prevent the export or transit for use 
of ei ther belligeren t or war ma terial. 
Up to and including WW 11, it was 
customary on the outbreak of a state of 
war for nonparticipating states to issue 
proclamations of neutrality, although 
such is not required. In both WW I and 
WW II the United States did issue such 
declarations, and hefore WW II, in a 
series of neu trality acts frolll ]935 
Ihrough 19:19, we adually h~gi:;lall'd our 
neu trality. Stringent adherence to the 
belligerent-neutral rights and duties 
method of establishing rules for warfare 
follows logically from the "war"-
"peace" dichotomy upon which such 
rules are premised. Perhaps the hest 
example of this is the sct of rules 
applicable to naval blockade. 
Traditional or close-in blockade had 
as its basis thc bdligcrent right to. 
embargo sea eOlllmcrce to and from its 
cncmy-to stop the flow of thos(~ goods, 
both inward and outward, which cn-
hancc thc enemy's warmaking effort. 
I310ckade was originally conceived and 
executed as thc maritime countcrpart of 
sicgc and sought the total prohibition of 
maritime COllllllunication with all or a 
designated portion of the enemy's coast-
line. Its focus was on ships, unlike thc 
law of contraband where thc focus was 
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on cargo. BIoekar.lr·, by its nature, in-
volves not only interference on the high 
s(:as with vessels flying til(! enemy's flag, 
but also with vessels flying the flag of 
neutral states. One of the most funda-
mental considerations in bloekade is 
that it applics to belligerent and neutral 
vessels alike; hence, one of its rcstric-
tions is on the othcrwise legally un-
restricted rip;ht of neutral states to trade 
with whomsoever they wish. In light of 
this fact, it is not surprising that neutral 
states insisted that the enforcement of a 
blockade must be in accordance with 
strict and clear rules. For the traditional 
close-in blockadc to be lawful it must 
be: 
• enforced by sufficient ships to be 
effective (i.e., to create a substantial rigk 
of apprehension for any would-be 
blockade runner); 
• enforced impartially against all 
ships, belligerent and neutral alike; 
• commenced with proper notifica-
tion; and 
• it must not bar access to neutral 
ports or coastlines. 
The last requirement has virtually 
precluded uge of traditional hloekad(! in 
1II0dl"rn warfan', sinee tIl(! d(~JlI()ynwnl 
of the bloc:kading force close ill tu tlw 
blockaded area is often impossible frum 
an operational vi(!wpoint, and geo-
graphical considerations make it dif-
fieult in many regions to .hloekade 
farther at sea and still not intc:rfc:n! with 
innocent neutral shipping or bar access 
to neu tral ports. 
Conversely, under traditional rules, 
establishmcnt of a belligerent hloc:kadl' 
would generate corresponding neutral 
rights and obligations for nonpartici-
pants ill the conflict. A neutral must: 
• require ships flying its flag to 
rcspcet the blockade; 
• require its ships to navigate so as 
not to unreasonably interfere with the 
blockading force; and 
• otherwise to freely navigate its 
ships in the area of the blockade. 
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Two major factors which charac-
teri;-a:d warfare over the first half of this 
century have rendered literal adhcrence 
to these detailed rulcs difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve. First, the scope 
of objectives sought by states at war 
expanded dram:ltieally over what it had 
been in the 19th century. And secondly, 
the dramatic advances in technology 
during these years geometrically in-
creased eaeh country's ahility to pursue 
its national objectives. World Wars rand 
II illustrated beyond doubt, if ever there 
was a doubt, that the amount of force 
which a state will employ in warfare 
varies in direct proportion to the scope 
of the objective sought to be aehieved. 
It should have surprised no one that 
when the conflict objective reaehcd the 
point of "unconditional surrender"-or, 
if you wish, of national survival-that 
the scales which seek to regulate eon-
lliet would be weighted most heavily on 
the side of military necessity. Considera-
tions of humanitarianism, whether we 
like it or not, simply took a back seal. 
Thm~, history would s(~em to sU{rgl'st 
that states will accept fewer and fewer 
restmints in the form of law as their 
national objectives beeollle more signifi-
cant to them. 
I think this can be illustrated quite 
well by the actions of all belligerents at 
sca during World Wars I and Il, for in 
each of these conflicts both sides 
adopted a type of maritime in Lerdiction 
which they felt was essential in a war of 
total dimensions, where not only the 
military but the eeonomie base of the 
enemy became a It:gitimate military 
objective. Thesc measures involved 
closing and patrolling large areas of the 
high seas, hundreds of miles from the 
enemy's coastline, with a view toward 
prohibiting all maritimc intercourse 
with the enemy. 
In practice the Germans even sank 
neutral ships, without warning, by the 
usc of unrestricted suhmarine warfare. 
British, and later United States, hloek-
ades of Germany were enforced by 
large.scale war zones, through whieh 
transit by an encmy or a neutral ship 
was made extrcmely hazardous by the 
use of mines and submarines. These 
policies represented major departures 
from the traditional law in that they 
utilized extensive resLricLion of access to 
neutral porLs and subjected ships aL-
tempting to breach the blockade to 
destruction without warning rather than 
to capture and condemnation ill pri",l:. 
In sum, the maritime interdiction prm:-
tiees during WW 1 ami WW 11 JIlI:an 1 
almost total control of, instead of mini-
mal interference with, neutral eom-
mercc. 
The WW II experiencc illustrates thaL 
in a eonniet situaLion where the objec-
tives of the participants are very broad, 
the commitment to such objectives may 
force parLieipants to reeasl tradiLional 
rules of naval warfare Lo allow tIll: 
exercise of thal degrce of force dcem(:d 
essential. 
An excellent example of this poinl is 
the submarine. The impacl of iLs cal'u-
bilitil!s should hav(: hem) ul'parl'n L dur-
ing the First World War. AfLer its early 
lise againsl surface warships, Germuny 
turll(!d her sulnnarines primarily ugainsl 
merchant shipping, sinking more than 
II million tons of Allied and neutral 
shipping. Yet efforts IwLween Lhe: wars, 
ainied at eSLablishing rules for the usc: of 
the submarine, ignored the technology 
of the new weapoll. AfLer unsuccessful 
attempLs to ban usc of the suhmarine 
entirely, rules were codified as "interna-
tional law" with n'speet Lo the: sub· 
nwrin(! ill tht: London Naval Tn~aty of 
1930 whieh provided: 
In their action wilh regard to 
merchant ships, submarines must 
conform to the rules of interna-
tional law to which surface vessels 
arc subject. 
In parLieular, except in eases of 
persisLent refusal to stop Oil being 
duly summoned, or of active resis-
tance to visit and search, a war-
ship, whether surface ve!'sel or 
submarine, may not sink or render 
incapable of navigation a merchant 
vessel without having first placed 
passengers, crew, and ship's papers 
in a place of safety. For this 
purpose the ship's boats arc not 
regarded as a place of safety un-
less the safety of the passengcrs 
and crew is assured, in the cxisting 
sea, and weather conditions, by 
the proximity of land or the 
presence of another vessel which 
is in a position to take them on 
board. 
These provisions werc reaffirmed vcr-
batim in the London Protocol of ] 936 
and thereafter were acceded to by 48 
states. All of the naval powers, including 
Germany, were bound by these rules at 
the outset of WW II. Clearly these 
provisions ignored the submarine's pri-
mary technological asset as a clandes-
tine, surprise weapons system, and con-
sequently they were bound to be ig-
nored. Submarines were unable to com-
ply with these rules without sacrificing 
thcir primary capabilities as a naval 
weapon. The all-encompassing con-
straints of these rules. dmfted without 
('onsirh'ration for the unique tedlllologi-
cal characteristics of the submarine and 
applied to a eonnict situation whie:h 
sought to forcefully ohtain the: hroadest 
political objectives, virtually insurcd 
that they would not be followed. In 
point of fact, the probability of success-
fully obtaining adherence to other than 
the most general conflict rules in an 
environment of total war is almost nil. 
Toward the close ofWW II, however, 
a new factor was inserted into the 
equation with the development of 
atomic weapons. Total war, or the 
objective of reducing one's enemy to 
total submission, can well be a course of 
action which rcsults in mutual annihihl-
lion. I t appears to me that our techno-
logical achievements have placed some 
practical limit on the scope of objectives 
which can be sought through the use of 
force. Having more limited objectives 
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permits the imp05ition and acceptance 
of more restrain ts. Hence, con tcm-
porary practicc since WW II has tendcd 
to blur traditional concepts of belligcr-
cnt and ncutral rights and duties. Statcs 
have not formally insistcd on "bclliger-
cnt" rights and, accordingly, - thosc 
states not IHlrtics to conflicts have not 
had occasion to insist on "neutral" 
rights. 
In contrast with the experienccs of 
World Wars I and II and as an illustra-
tion of the type of conflict. in which 
participants morc rcadily accept rc-
straints in the form of law, I think we 
can refer just bricfly to thc cxpcrienee 
in Vietnam. 
When contrasted to the experienc(!S 
of World Wars I and II, the .Vit!lnam 
affair provides some useful insights-in 
the form of law-of the restraints the' 
participants will aeccpt in today's con-
flict situations. Regardless of the c\assi.e 
definition of war accepted by interna-
tional law, there is no doubt that 
Vietnam has becn a conflict of major 
proportions. Yet the objectives have 
always been limited, and thus we have 
witn($sed -tIl(! exercisc of signifieant 
n:~trailll. Submarines have not be'(:n 
utili1.ed, and no blockade or minefields 
have been established around either 
North or South Vi(:tnarn. In short, thc 
Victnam conflict has not resulted in the 
parties excrcising those powers at sea 
which would be cxpeeted if the conflict 
were traditionally categorized as a war. 
Obviously, thc situation in Victnam has 
not been, and is not now, a time of 
p(~aee. Yet that conflict has been fough t 
in the maritime environment according 
to rulcs, primarily the peacetime rules 
set forth in the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tions on the Law of the Sea. 
Operation Market Timc is an excel-
lent examplc. The peacetime rulc re-
lating to the territorial sea holds that 
such watcrs arc subject to the exclusive 
sovereignty of the coastal state. This has 
hut ~)J)e exccption, and that is the right 
of foreign vesscls to engage ill innocent 
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passage through the territorial sea of a 
coastal state. The Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone states that "Passage is 
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal state." Sou th Vietnam, in its 
] 965 decree on sea surveillanel!, served 
notice that its 3-mile territorial sea was 
going to be vigorously patrolled and 
that vessels of any country "not e1early 
engaged in innocent passage are subject 
to visit and search and may be subject 
to arrest and disposition ... in con-
formity with aeccpted principles of in-
ternational law." It thereafter listed the 
type of cargoes-war goods-which 
would be considered suspect. TIH:rdore, 
within the 3-miIe band of territorial 
waters, peacetime rules were found to 
be adequate to deal with the threat 
posed. 
International law also, in the form of 
this same] 958 convention, provides for 
the cxereise of some degn!e of eouLrol 
in the eontigu{)us ~one which can ex-
tend a total of 12 miles from the 
baseline frolll which the tl:rritorial s(:a is 
measurell. Within this 9-!IIil(! hand of 
waten; eonLiguous to till: South Vit:lna-
mese territorial sea, tlH: peacetime rules 
provide that "the coastal state !IIay 
exercise that degree of eon trolneees~ii1ry 
to prevent infringement of its customs, 
fiscal, immigraLion, or sanitation regula-
tions eommitLed within its terriLory or 
territorial sea." South Vietnam aceord-
ingly provided that all vessds within iL<; 
contiguous ~one wew subjeet to visit 
and search, and arrest where appropri-
ate, for violation of any of the ahove 
regulations. It further provided that Lhe 
entry of any person or goods through 
oLher than reeogni~ed ports was for-
bidden by South Vietnamese ellstoms 
Hnt! immigration regulations and that 
the:;l: regulations wen: going to be 
stridly en forced. Thus, through sole 
rdianee on the peacetime convention on 
tI)(' terri torial sea and the contiguolls 
~one, So.uth Vietnam hm; been able to 
control virtually all threats that occur 
within 12 miles of land. 
One possible situation remains un-
controlled under the J 965 decree. That 
is the situation where a North Vietna-
llIese vessel, which is known by Lhc 
South Vietnamese to be a North Vietna-
mese vessel, is outside the 12-mile 7.0111: 
and obviously carrying wI:apons Lo bl: 
used by the Vietcong against Lltt: South 
Vietnamese Government. NeiLher Lhe 
decree nor the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tions cover this type of siLuation. There 
is precedent, however, in current inLer-
national law for South VieLnam Lo act 
against such a vessel should it become 
necessary. 
I rcfl:r to the basic right of every 
state Lo Lake such actions aL sea as arc 
reasonable and necessary to proLect iLs 
security interest against the hostilt: m:Ls 
of other states. The old case of Lhe 
U.S.-flag ship Virgillius is fr':quenLly 
eited in support of this proposiLion. 
This ship was sl:i~ed by the Spanish 
authorities in 187B while it was in Lhe 
process of LransporLing arms to Cuban 
insurgents. The British ship Dccrhoulld 
was sei~ed by Spanish warships during 
the Spanish Civil War for tlw san II: 
reasons, and during the Algerian war, 
French warships stopped at leasL Lwo 
ships-one a British and one a Yugoslav, 
boLh of which were suspecLed of tlte 
same offense. Although it has not been 
considered necessary, I Ldieve Lhat 
these cases could be us(:d as prccI:dl:nt 
for South Vietnlllll to sl:i~l: a ron:i~n 
veS~I'1 on the high sl'as whidJ illJnwdi· 
atdy Lhn:atens Lheir seeuriLy during this 
period of instabiliLY. 
I do not suppose one should discuss 
the rules rdating to the usc of Corce at 
sl:a in a situation short of war without 
mentioning brielly the Cuban quanlll-
tin e 0 I' 0 e Lober/Novl:Jnbl:r L 962. 
Briefly, the lJuanllltiJJ(! m:tion involvnd 
Lhe dl:daratiol/ of 1:I:rLail/ areas of LIII: 
high :;eas adjacent to Cuba in which all 
shipping suspected of being houI/d for 
Cuban ports and of earrying cI:rLain 
d':signat(:d contraband p;oods would 1)(: 
suhj(:ctcd to visit and search. Ships 
found to bc carrying prohibitcd ~oods 
and bound for Cuba would be diverted 
from their intended port. A clearancc 
certificate procedure was cstablished 
under which a ship at its port of 
departurc could be certified as innocen t 
and thus would be permittcd to pass 
through the quarantine zone unin ter-
rupted. 
The quarantine differed from a 
blockade in that it: 
• sought to ban only certain items 
of contraband goods, rather than all 
maritime intercourse; 
8 used as methods of enforcem(:nt 
only visit, search, and diversion and did 
not employ destruction without warn-
ing; 
• sought to avoid the consequences 
of a formal statc of war. 
The quarantine actually bore a very 
close relationship to till: 01(1 law of 
contraband, undl:r whieh belligerents 
claimed the right to prohibit the inflow 
of certain strategic goods into enemy 
ports. 
Them was obvious and elt:ar inter-
ference with the pcaeetime rights of the 
Soviet Union and of Cuba to trad,: with 
whomsoever they pleased and to utilize 
the !mas for th is purpose. As 1 indieatl:d 
earlier, we havI: seen this type of inter-
ference in modern times only in those 
cast's where the objectives arc of the 
highest order. SIH:h was the case in 
Cuba, of course. The stationing of nu-
clear missiles a scant 90 miles frolll our 
shores was considered such a threat tlwt 
we wcre willing to risk a broadening of 
our disputc with Cuba, even to the 
point of involving open conflict, if 
m:cessury, with the Soviet Union. 
think thesl: two illustrutions 
,lcmHlIIHtratl: mtlll:r dl:arly that thl: baHic: 
polil'y inl-(n:ilients whidl underlay thl: 
traditional laws of naval warf arc con-
tinue to LII: opl:rative today. This is true: 
even though we do not havI: the classic 
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requirement of nil aetual state of war or 
helligen:ncy. 
The basic ingredient, as I havc noted 
e'l.rljer, was a political need to limit the 
conflict both as to area and as to 
participants, and I think it is clear that 
the grcat bulk of the rules which we call 
rules of naval warfare really involvc this 
limitatioli and with it thc belligerent 
neu tral relationship. The same con-
siderations which gave risl: to thc tradi-
tional laws of neutrality, particularly as 
they rclate to sea wnrfnre, continue to 
bc givcn hced by policymakcrs today in 
situutions short of wur. 
Thc major political considcration in n 
20th ccntury Iimitcd wnr is the same as 
it was in the 17th and 18th centuries-
the need to limit the conflict, to kecp it 
from unnccessarily spilling over to 
nffcct nonpnrticipnnts. This has mcant, 
in Victnam for cxamplc, that we do not 
interfere with commcrce into North 
Vil!lnmn, even though thut comlIwre(: 
has been essential to their conduct of 
hostilities. 
We havc not insisted on belligerent 
rights ut sea because to do so would 
involvc othcr major powers und broadl:n 
the scope of the eonf(iel. 
On thc other IUlnd, the Cuban situu-
Lion illustrates thut where LIII: ein:ulII-
~taJlel:g un: right, a state will inHist, (:VI!II 
ill a peacetime situation, .to whut was 
trnditionully known liS 11 bc:lIigen:nt 
right. The qucstion today reully i~ not a 
purely II!gul onc, und it never really wus. 
The rules arc mcrely a reflcction of 
the (Iolitieal renlitil:';. Und"l:r the old lmv, 
if 01\1: wished to exen:ise belligen:nt 
rights at sen, partieularly as th,:se rights 
eame to Le cx(:rcised in World Wars L 
and 11, one had to m;~ume the risk of 
broadening the eonflieL, of making 
I:ne:mil's out of nl'utrals. The Haml' iH 
tnll' today. If a Htate wislws to utilizl: 
foree at ~l'a, other than dir':t:lly against 
his auvI:rsary, he must run the risk of 
bringing others into the hostilities. 
Except in eascs like thl: 1962 missill! 
crisis, whcrc the nutionul seeurity is 
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thn~aterH:d, the poten tial risk is just too 
great today for a state to claim belliger-
ent rights. 
Where cloes all this leave us? Whilc~ at 
one tillle 1 was ready to eritieiy,e rather 
severely til(' war/peaee diehotomy, my 
views of late have lJ('(~n influ(~tl(:ed hy 
what I see as a commendable stability 
in relations between stat.es which that 
dichotomy forces upon us. The reason 
for this, of course, is the political 
realities which underlie that separa-
tion. 
These questions have heen the suo-
jed of eonsiderable study for some time 
now. These efforts are aimed lit trying 
to determine whether there should he 1I 
brom] progrlllll for prepllring lIdditional 
l-TJ.tidl'lines for use by 1I11vlli forees in 
!'ituations short of wlIr. So 1 will dOim 
hy silllply posing that (]um;tion to you. 
Is till' current war/pellce dic'hotoIllY, 
and its rules for thc: rcgulation of 
conflict lit sea, slItisfaetory for tlte 
conlc'lIIporar} c'nvironnIC'nL"? Or do 
navlli COJlIIIHIIII!c:rs lH:c'd somc:thillg nc:w 
to guide thelll ill situaliolls short of 
war? I slIppose whllL I alii really asking 
is, "Arc our presellt peaec:tilllc: rulc:s 
adequate?" 
Now that I haVe! rlli:-;c:d LIte '!uc::-;Lioll, 
perhaps some of YOIl would likc: Lo 
suggesL some answers which could be of 
assistallce to us. 
----!p----
